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INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,' the Louisiana
Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of informed consent to medical
treatment and the statutory presumption of a valid consent provided
in Louisiana's Uniform Consent Law, Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.40.2 In its first ruling on Hondroulis,3 the supreme court held
that a written consent form which signifies the patient's consent in
language that tracks the language of the statute4 provides a rebuttable
presumption of validity of informed consent to the medical procedure.
© Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989).
2. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977 and Supp. 1989).
3. 531 So. 2d 450, rev'd, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989) (Hondroulis 1).
4. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 provides in part:
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written consent to medical
treatment means a consent in writing to any medical or surgical procedure or
course of procedures which (a) sets forth in general terms the nature and
purpose of the procedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if
any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of
function of any organ or limb, of disfiguring scars associated with such
procedure or procedures, (b) acknowledges that such disclosure of information
has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure or procedures
have been answered in a satisfactory manner, and (c) is signed by the patient
for whom the procedure is to be performed, or if the patient for any reason
lacks legal capacity to consent by a person who has legal authority to consent
on behalf of such patient in such circumstances. Such consent shall be presumed
to be valid and effective, in the absence of proof that. execution of the consent
was induced by misrepresentation of material facts.
B. Except as provided in Subsection A of this Section, no evidence shall be
admissible to modify or limit the authorization for performance of the pro-
cedure or procedures set forth in such written consent.
C. Where consent to medical treatment from a patient, or from a person
authorized by law to consent to medical treatment for such patient, is secured
other than in accordance with Subsection A above, the explanation to the
patient or to the person consenting for such patient shall include the matters
set forth in Paragraph (a) of Subsection A above, and an opportunity shall
be afforded for asking questions concerning the procedures to be performed
which shall be answered in a satisfactory manner. Such consent shall be valid
and effective and is subject to proof according to the rules of evidence in
ordinary cases.
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In its second ruling on Hondroulisl the supreme court held that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 creates a rebuttable presumption
of consent, not informed consent. In so doing, the court expressly
overruled an earlier determination 6 that the statute superseded the
jurisprudential rules on informed consent developed before its enact-
ment.
FACTS AND HOLDING OF HONDROULIS
Ms. Hondroulis consulted Dr. Schuhmacher because of pain in her
lower back which radiated into her right hip and leg. Dr. ,Schuhmacher
performed a second back surgery to relieve pressure on her nerves.
Prior to the surgery, Ms. Hondroulis signed a consent form containing
the following statement:
I understand and acknowledge that the following risks are
associated with this procedure including anesthesia; death; brain
damage; disfiguring scars; paralysis; the loss or loss of function
of body organs; and the loss or loss of function of any arm
or leg.
After the surgery, Ms. Hondroulis continued to experience lower
back pain, lost control of her sphincter and bladder, and experienced
numbness in her left leg. Ms. Hondroulis filed suit against Dr.
Schuhmacher alleging that he failed to obtain her informed consent
to the operation. Although Ms. Hondroulis did not deny signing the
form nor allege that she was induced to sign the form by misrepre-
sentation, she testified she was given no oral information about possible
risks or complications of the surgery. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Schuhmacher, holding that Ms. Hondroulis
was bound by the consent form. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal en banc considered the claim, and a five-judge panel af-
firmed.' It held that the court was bound by prior jurisprudence.8 The
supreme court affirmed, 9 holding that the written consent form which
tracked the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 created
a rebuttable presumption of valid informed consent, which Ms. Hon-
droulis failed to rebut.
5. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989) (Hondroulis II).
6. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983).
7. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 521 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted,
522 So. 2d 571 (1988), rev'd, 553 So. 2d 398 (1989).
8. Madere v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 505 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987);
Leiva v. Nance, 506 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 512 So. 2d 1176
(1987); Leonhard v. New Orleans E. Orthopedic Clinic, 485 So. 2d 1008 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 919 (1986).
9. 553 So. 2d at 398.
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In its first opinion, the supreme court set forth four elements which
Ms. Hondroulis needed to prove in order to rebut the presumption:
(1) that the adverse consequences of the surgery were known, significant
and material risks which Dr. Schuhmacher should have disclosed to
her; (2) that Dr. Schuhmacher did not disclose them; (3) that she was
unaware of these risks; and (4) a reasonable person with knowledge
of these risks would have refused the surgery.10
On rehearing, the supreme court reversed its previous holding and
remanded to the trial court. The court held, inter alia, that the informed
consent statute was only intended to be a "modest amendment" in
the informed consent doctrine, merely to establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption of consent to encounter only those risks adequately described
in a consent form." The court also reviewed the informed consent
doctrine in Louisiana prior to the enactment of the statute. The court
enumerated the elements of a cause of action for lack of informed
consent, drawing language from Canterbury v. Spence,12 a 1972 case
from a jurisdiction that did not have an informed consent statute. In
Hondroulis II, the supreme court reasoned that due to the generality
of the language of the consent form signed by Ms. Hondroulis, her
allegations raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether she
exercised informed consent.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
Lack of Consent
The general principle from which the causes of action for lack of
consent and lack of informed consent arise was first stated in Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospitals3 by Judge Cardozo: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body.' ' 4 Various authorities'" have
interpreted this principle to be embodied in the U.S. Constitution and
the right to privacy found in Griswold v. Connecticut.'6 In Schloen-
10. Id. at 404.
11. Id. at 417-18.
12. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972).
13. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
14. Id. at 93.
15. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.
Ct. 319 (1976), the court went so far as to find "the right to privacy sufficiently broad
to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical therapy, even though that decision
might lead to death." See also, In Re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); Crain v.
Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (D.C. App. 1982).
16. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
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dorff, performance of a medical procedure without consent was found
to be a battery. 7 A battery is usually thought of as an intentional
"harmful or offensive contact,' 8 but a contact which does not cause
harm may be considered a battery because there was no consent to
it.' 9 Thus, a medical procedure which obtains good results may be
considered a battery because the patient did not consent to the pro-
cedure.
In Louisiana, the performance of a surgical procedure on a patient
without the patient's consent is an "unauthorized touching" and has
been repeatedly held to be a battery. 20 An unauthorized surgery having
good results still constitutes a battery. Lack of consent actions also
include an action for the performance of a procedure different from
the one for which consent was given. In Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 2' Ms.
Wilson consented to exploratory surgery after being diagnosed as having
endometriosis. 22 During the operation, Dr. Pizzalotto found severe
endometrial adhesions, which he believed had damaged the reproductive
organs and had rendered Ms. Wilson sterile. Believing that this con-
dition would result in pain, infections, and the need for a second
surgery, Dr. Pizzalotto performed a total hysterectomy. The Louisiana
Supreme Court found Dr. Pizzalotto liable for battery. Although the
surgery may have been necessary, the supreme court found that it was
not an emergency, and was therefore a battery since performed without
the patient's consent. 23
Lack of Informed Consent
A doctor's duty to adequately inform a patient about a medical
procedure was first recognized in 1957 by the California Court of
Appeals in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University.24 The court in
Salgo emphasized the need for a patient's intelligent consent in requiring
a physician to disclose facts and known dangers of the procedure.
Canterbury v. Spence,25 a leading case on the informed consent doc-
17. 105"N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
18. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 9 (5th ed. 1984).
19. Id.
20. Pizzalotta v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983); Beck v. Lovell, 361 So. 2d 245
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 802 (1978); Coppage v. Gamble, 324 So.
2d 21 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), writ denied, 325 So. 2d 819 (La. 1976).
21. 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983).
22. Endometriosis is a disease where the lining of the uterus backs up into the
uterus, fallopian tubes and ovaries rather than being discharged during the menstrual
cycle. If not treated, endometriosis can cause cysts, and adhesions between the repro-
ductive and other pelvic organs, ultimately causing sterility. Id. at 861.
23. Id. at 865.
24. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. App. 1957).
25. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972).
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trine, noted three exceptions to a doctor's duty to disclose information:
(1) commonly known risks, (2) "therapeutic privilege," and (3) emer-
gency. Under Canterbury, a doctor does not have to inform a patient
of a risk which a person of average experience would be aware. A
doctor also has no duty to inform patients of risks that would cause
great anxiety which would hinder the treatment. This second exceptiori
is known as the "therapeutic privilege." The emergency exception exists
when a patient is either unconscious or unable to communicate, and
the harm which would result from no treatment outweighs any danger
of treatment.
The court in Canterbury distinguished lack -of-informed consent
from battery. Where there is a lack of informed consent, the patient
is aware of the type of surgery to be performed. The surgery is
authorized and is thus not a battery. The failure to inform is viewed
as a negligent performance of the doctor's duty to inform. By char-
acterizing an action for lack of informed consent as a negligence action,
the court required the plaintiff to prove duty, breach and causation.
The duty established in Canterbury required a doctor to inform a
patient of all known risks that are material to the patient's decision
including alternative forms of treatment. The test for disclosure was
an objective one:
[A] risk is . . . material when a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's po-
sition, would be likely to attach significance to the risk ...
in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.16
Canterbury also established an objective test for causation known
as the "prudent-patient" standard.27 Instead of relying on the
plaintiff's testimony that he would have refused surgery if he
had known of the risk of the injury sustained, the court in
Canterbury looked to what an adequately informed, prudent
person would have decided. Prior to the enactment of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 40:1299.40, the Louisiana courts adopted the
Canterbury objective standard for the duty of disclosure, 28 but
disagreed on the adoption of a causation standard.2 9
26. Id. at 787.
27. For a discussion of other standards, and an excellent general discussion of
informed consent, see Boland, The Doctrines of Lack of Consent and Lack of Informed
Consent in Medical Procedures in Louisiana, 45 La. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
28. Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 1218 (1977); Parker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
335 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 338 So. 2d 700 (1976); Goodwin v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 294 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 299 So.
2d 788 (1974).
29. Cf. Bush v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 264 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 266 So. 2d 452 (1972); Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 294
So. 2d 618 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 299 So. 2d 788 (1974).
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Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40, The Uniform Consent Law
Beginning in 1975, state legislatures across the nation began re-
sponding to a medical malpractice crisis,30 which was the result of an
increase in insurance premiums demanded by insurance companies.
Health care providers who were unable to obtain insurance at reason-
able rates opted to decrease or cease rendering certain services with
high potential liabilities. To avoid this obvious danger to the public
welfare, state legislatures enacted substantive and procedural rules de-
signed to decrease the liability of medical practitioners.3' The three
most common ways that legislatures attempted to decrease medical
malpractice liability were (1) to limit the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases, (2) to shorten the statute of
limitations for malpractice actions, and (3) to alter the presumptions
and burdens of proof in informed consent cases.32
In 1975, the Louisiana Legislature enacted33 the Uniform Consent
Law34 and the Medical Malpractice Act.35 In the first case to consider
the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act,36 Justice Calogero recognized
that in passing the Act the legislature was "reacting to what it con-
sidered a crisis in the delivery of medical services to the people of
this state, a crisis ostensibly prompted by prohibitive costs in connection
with medical malpractice insurance .... -37 While Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.40 is not considered part of the Medical Malpractice
Act, it is consistent with it and was also enacted in response to the
medical malpractice crisis.3"
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 provides in pertinent part
that "written consent to medical treatment means a consent in writing
to any medical . . . procedure . . . which (a) sets forth in general terms
the nature and purpose of the procedure ... together with the known
risks, if any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the
loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, of disfiguring scars
30. Between 1975 and 1977 over 450 bills were introduced, and 175 statutes were
enacted or amended in state legislatures, all concerning medical malpractice. Comment,
An Analysis of State Legislative Responses To the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975
Duke L.J. 1417, and authorities cited therein.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1425-42.
33. 1975 La. Acts No. 529 § 1, 817 § 1.
34. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977 and Supp. 1989).
35. La. R.S. 40:1299.41 (1977 and Supp. 1989).
36. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
37. Id. at 1261.
38. In Hondroulis I!, the supreme court acknowledged that the state interests served
by La. R.S. 40:1299.40 were the decreasing of the number of fraudulent claims, the
reducing of insurance costs and the attracting of new medical talent to the state because
of these reductions. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher 553 So. 2d 398, 416 (La. 1989).
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associated with such procedure. . .," and that "[s]uch consent shall
be presumed to be valid and effective, in the absence of proof that
execution of the consent was induced by misrepresentation of material
facts."
In LaCaze v. Collier,39 the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the
significance of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40. Ms. LaCaze
consented to a hysterectomy by signing a form which tracked the
language of the statute. As a result of the surgery, Ms. LaCaze suffered
bladder incontinence. The supreme court found Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 40:1299.40 to supersede the jurisprudential forms of consent
previously permitted. The court determined that subsections A and C
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40,40 when taken together, pro-
vided for permissible forms of both written and oral consent which
were held to be "the exclusive methods for obtaining consent to treat-
ment." '41 The court also interpreted the Uniform Consent Law to require
disclosure of all known risks, whether or not material, but not to
require the disclosure of alternative treatments. The court acknowledged
that the risk that Ms. LaCaze's condition would result from her hys-
terectomy was .05076 and suggested that the risk was not material.
Nevertheless, the court held this risk to be "known" to Dr. Collier
and therefore requiring disclosure. The court also held that the con-
dition was a "loss of function of an organ" because "a bladder which
leaks no longer performs ... [its] function." 42 The court adopted an
objective standard of causation. Ms. LaCaze was denied recovery be-
cause the court determined that, considering Ms. LaCaze's circum-
stances, a reasonable patient would have undergone the hysterectomy
regardless of the .05% chance of incontinence.
The Louisiana Supreme Court overruled all prior jurisprudence
concerning informed consent when it interpreted the Uniform Consent
Law in LaCaze v. Collier.43 The court stated that compliance with the
statute was the only means by which to obtain consent to a medical
procedure.44 The court interpreted the statute as requiring a physician
to inform a patient of all known risks, whether or not material. The
court used an objective standard of causation. In Hondroulis 1,45 the
supreme court states that LaCaze adopted an objective test for informed
39. 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983).
40. Subsection A provides for a written consent form and subsection C provides
for consent "secured other than in accordance with Subsection A.
41. 434 So. 2d at 1046.
42. Id. at 1047.
43. Id. at 1039.
44. Id. at 1046.
45. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989).
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consent.46 LaCaze did adopt an objective standard for causation, but
not an objective standard of disclosure. LaCaze stated that all risks
must be disclosed regardless of materiality. It is the definition of a
material risk that makes a disclosure requirement objective. If all known
risks have to be disclosed, then the disclosure requirement cannot be
an objective one because it ignores the materiality of the risks. Nev-
ertheless, the court in Hondroulis I reinstated the objective disclosure
requirement.47 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
doctor because the consent form signed by Ms. Hondroulis created a
presumption of informed consent that Ms. Hondroulis was unable to
overcome. In Hondroulis II, the court narrowed the presumption cre-
ated by a statutory consent form. Unlike Hondroulis I, the court in
Hondroulis II decided that the consent form did not create a pre-
sumption of informed consent. Instead, the consent form created a
presumption of consent only to those "risks adequately described in
the consent form in layman's terms." ' 48 The court also overruled its
previous holding in LaCaze to the extent that it had stated that the
Uniform Consent Law provides the sole means of obtaining consent
to medical treatment.49 Instead, the court in Hondroulis II viewed the
Uniform Consent Law as a "modest amendment" to the doctrine of
informed consent.5 0 According to the court, the jurisprudence effective
prior to the enactment of the Uniform Consent Law is still applicable
to informed consent cases.
ANALYSIS
On rehearing,5 ' the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed its previous
holding in Hondroulis P 2 that a written consent form which tracks
the language of the Uniform Consent Law53 gives rise to a presumption
of valid informed consent. The supreme court reached three inter-
mediate conclusions which led to the reinterpretation of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 40:1299.40: (1) the right to privacy contained in the
Louisiana Constitution includes the right to decide whether to undergo
medical treatment;14 (2) the legislative intent behind Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.40 was to establish a rebuttable presumption of consent
46. Id. at 402.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 417.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 418.
51. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989).
52. Id.
53. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977 and Supp. 1989).
54. 553 So. 2d at 415.
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to encounter risks adequately described in the consent form;" and (3)
the legislature did not intend to make substantive changes to the
doctrine of informed consent by enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.40.56 While the ultimate conclusion to deny Dr. Schuhmacher
summary judgment was correct, the preliminary conclusions require
close examination.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Louisiana Supreme Court, correctly concluded that the right
to privacy protected by the Louisiana Constitution includes "the right
to decide whether to obtain or reject medical treatment." 7 The court
observed that the decision to undergo medical treatment, like decisions
concerning marriage,5" contraception, 9 and family relations, 60 "clearly"
should be one of those personal decisions constitutionally protected by
the right to privacy. 6'
The court's conclusion is consistent with the intended meaning of
Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. The doctrine of
informed consent is founded upon the right of self-determination. 62
Article I, Section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution expressly pro-
vides protection to individuals against unreasonable "invasions of pri-
vacy." This protection was intended to "accelerate the tentative steps" 63
of Griswold v. Connecticut" and to provide an express right to privacy
which encompasses the right of self determination. 65
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
The Uniform Consent Law affects the right to decide whether to
obtain or reject medical treatment. Because this right is now protected
under the Louisiana Constitution, Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40
55. Id. at 417.
56. Id. at 418.
57. Id. at 415.
58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
59. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
60. Price v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944).
61. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 414 (La. 1989). In discussing the
fundamental nature of the right to decide one's own medical treatment, the court likened
that right to the right to decide to continue or terminate a pregnancy. Although beyond
the scope of this paper, Hondroulis II has great implications on-the right to choose
an abortion as protected by the Louisiana Constitution.
62. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)'
63. Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35.La.
L. Rev. 1, 20 (1974).
64. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
65. Hargrave, supra note 63, at 21.
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must be examined carefully. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40
reads:
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written
consent to medical treatment means a consent in writing to
any medical or surgical procedure or course of procedures which
(a) sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the
procedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if any,
of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or
loss of function of any organ or limb, of disfiguring scars
associated with such procedure or procedures, (b) acknowledges
that such disclosure of information has been made and that
all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have
been answered in a satisfactory manner, and (c) is signed by
the patient for whom the procedure is to be performed, or if
the patient for any reason lacks legal capacity to consent by
a person who has legal authority to consent on behalf of such
patient in such circumstances. Such consent shall be presumed
to be valid and effective, in the absence of proof that execution
of the consent was induced by misrepresentation of material
facts.
B. Except as provided in Subsection A of this Section, no
evidence shall be admissible to modify or limit the authorization
for performance of the procedure or procedures set forth in
such written consent.
C. Where consent to medical treatment from a patient, or
from a person authorized by law to consent to medical treat-
ment for such patient, is secured other than in accordance with
Subsection A above, the explanation to the patient or to the
person consenting for such patient shall include the matters
set forth in Paragraph (a) of Subsection A above, and an
opportunity shall be afforded for asking questions concerning
the procedures to be performed which shall be answered in a
satisfactory manner. Such consent shall be valid and effective
and is subject to proof according to the rules of evidence in
ordinary cases.
The fourth circuit interpreted this statute to provide a presumption
of valid and informed consent to the medical procedure described
which was only rebuttable by proof that the consent was induced by
misrepresentation of material facts. The fourth circuit also construed
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40(B) to preclude the admission of
any evidence not concerning misrepresentation to rebut the presumption
in subsection A. 66 This construction, by allowing only the validity and
66. 521 So. 2d 534, 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
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not the content of the consent form to be rebutted, in effect created
an irrebuttable presumption of consent under the statute, which gave
enormous protection to physicians. A general consent form that tracked
the language of the statute would, as a matter of law, 67 constitute
valid consent to medical treatment. Although a physician has a duty
to inform patients of material risks associated with medical procedures,
liability for breach of this duty could be avoided by obtaining the
patient's "consent" on a form that tracks the language of the statute.
By providing such an easy avoidance of liability, the statute as inter-
preted by the fourth circuit would encourage physicians to gain a
patient's consent by signature of a general consent form, rather than
by adequately disclosing the material risks of the proposed procedure.
The amount of information disclosed to patients would decrease. With-
out specific information about the procedure and material risks in-
volved, patients would be unable to make an intelligent decision
concerning medical treatment.
The supreme court declared the fourth circuit's interpretation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 to be unconstitutional because
"the practical effect" of the statute would be to burden the patient's
right to decide whether to undergo medical treatment by "substantially
limiting" access to material information without the justification of a
compelling state interest.68 To avoid declaring the statute itself uncon-
stitutional, the supreme court reinterpreted it more narrowly to regulate
the proof of informed consent.
The court concluded that the statute established a rebuttable pre-
sumption of consent to encounter only those risks adequately described
in the consent form. The court justified this conclusion on three
grounds. 69 First, to interpret the statute as providing an irrebuttable
presumption would render it unconstitutional. Second, the term "pre-
sumption" should be interpreted as being rebuttable unless the statute
expressly states that the presumption is conclusive. Third, the pre-
sumption of "consent" does not mean "informed consent."
The court was correct to conclude that Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.40 must be interpreted to provide a rebuttable and not a
conclusive presumption. Yet the court took an unnecessary step of
stating that the presumption which arises is of mere consent and not
informed consent. The actual presumption does not need to be changed.
A written general consent form which provides a presumption of valid
informed consent would not be unconstitutional if the presumption
67. An irrebuttable presumption is no presumption at all, but is a rule of law.
553 So. 2d 398, 417 (La. 1989).
68. Id. at 419.
69. Id. at 417.
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was rebuttable. A consent form which creates a rebuttable presumption
of informed consent would still not be absolute protection from liability
for the physician, and the unreasonable burden on a patient's access
to information would not be present. Furthermore, the supreme court's
current interpretation of the statute renders section A(b) useless. In
that section, the patient "acknowledges that such disclosure of infor-
mation has been made. . . ." If the only risks presumed to be disclosed
are those already contained in the consent form, there would be no
need for a patient to acknowledge the disclosure of that information.
Also, there is more than one way to disclose information. Disclosure
can be written or oral. Considering that subsection (b) which contains
the "acknowledgment of disclosure" also acknowledges that questions
have been answered satisfactorily, it is reasonable to conclude that this
acknowledgment is of information communicated but not evidenced in
the consent form.7 0 The supreme court reinterpreted the statute to
provide a presumption of valid consent to encounter only those risks
adequately disclosed in the consent form. 71 It is possible to reinterpret
the statute without re-writing it. The supreme court should have in-
terpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 to provide a rebuttable
presumption of valid informed consent to all material risks of the
described medical treatment when a written form which complies with
subsections (a), (b), and (c) is produced. Although material information
may not be disclosed on the written form, subsection (b) contains an
acknowledgment that such information has been disclosed. If this pre-
sumption of informed consent is rebuttable, a plaintiff could rebut
the presumption by proving that no disclosure beyond the written form
was made.
The type of communication desired between a doctor and a patient
should also be considered in determining the extent of the presumption.
The supreme court's interpretation of the statute would cause a doctor
to disclose all material risks in a written consent form to gain the
benefit of the presumption. Having disclosed all material risks in the
form, a physician would have little incentive to discuss with the patient
the proposed treatment and alternative treatments and their respective
material risks. The majority, if not all, of the information commu-
nicated to the patient would be through the written consent form.
Under the interpretation which leaves intact the presumption of
valid and informed consent to all material risks by use of the statutory
70. See Bolland, Recent Developments in Patient Consents in Medical Procedures
in Louisiana, 32 La. B.J. 23, 27 n.9. The author comments that "Itihe informed consent
must be conveyed to the patient so that he fully comprehends or understands the
information given to him and the 'acknowledgment' and 'answering the questions of
the patient' requirements in the statute are consistent with this interpretation."
71. 553 So. 2d at 417.
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language, a general consent form could be used to gain the benefit
of the presumption. If that general consent form did not adequately
disclose a material risk, the doctor would lose the benefit of the
presumption if the plaintiff showed that no other communications
outside of the written form disclosed the material risk. Under this
interpretation, the doctor would be encouraged to discuss the procedure
with the patient. This discussion would provide an opportunity for the
patient to ask questions, and a second opportunity for the doctor to
explain things that the patient did not understand or found trouble-
some. The second interpretation provides a greater opportunity for the
patient to receive adequate information through a meaningful com-
munication than that provided by the first interpretation.
EFFECT OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 40:1299.40 UPON THE
DOCTRINE OFINFORMED CONSENT
In 1983, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared in LaCaze v. Col-
lier, 2 that Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 superseded the ju-
risprudential rules defining informed consent. In Hondroulis I,73 the
supreme court overruled this holding. The court chose instead to view
the statute as "a modest amendment to the informed consent doc-
trine. 7 4 The court went on to conclude that the legislature did not
intend to make substantive changes to the doctrine of informed consent
by enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40. 71 The Louisiana
statute is similar to other statutes that have generally been interpreted
to affect the presumptions and burdens of proof in the informed
consent doctrine.7 6 If this statute did not supersede prior jurisprudence,
then the jurisprudential rules in existence before the enactment of the
statute77 are still in effect. What those jurisprudential rules are is not
very clear. LaCaze v. Collier was recognized for ending the confusion
about the doctrine of informed consent in Louisiana. 7 The circuit
courts were in disagreement over the use of a subjective or objective
72. 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983).
73. 553 So. 2d at 418.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 766.103(4) (Supp. 1990); Idaho Code § 39-4305 (1975); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 90-21.13 (1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54(86); Utah Code Ann. §
78-14-5(2)(e) (1976). These statutes differ as to whether the presumptions are rebuttable
or not, but all concern presumptions.
77. 1975 La. Acts No. 529 § 1.
78. Boland, Doctrines of Lack of Consent and Lack of Informed Consent in
Louisiana, 45 La. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
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test for causation. 9 Regardless of what the prior jurisprudence was,
the supreme court clarified the jurisprudential rules by adopting the
cause of action first developed in Canterbury v. Spence.s0 The court
sets out the doctrine of informed consent in Hondroulis II to consist
of a doctor's duty to disclose material information"' with the exceptions
of emergency, therapeutic privilege and unknown or immaterial risks, 2
and an objective, or "prudent-patient" standard for causation. 83
DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The supreme court denied Dr. Schuhmacher's motion for summary
judgment. Dr. Schuhmacher moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the general consent form signed by Ms. Hondroulis created
an irrebuttable presumption of informed consent.8 4 The supreme court
held that this form created a rebuttable presumption that Ms. Hon-
droulis consented to "whatever risks a reasonable person, in what the
doctor knew or should have known to be the patient's position, would
have apprehended from the written consent form." 5 Ms. Hondroulis
averred that the risk of loss of control of her bladder was a known,
material risk and that a reasonable person would have foregone treat-
ment if adequately informed of this risk. Due to the supreme court's
construction of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40, the issue at
motion for summary judgment was whether the language "loss of
function of a bodily organ" would inform a reasonable person of the
risk of loss of control of the bladder. Dr. Schuhmacher did not carry
his burden of showing that there was no issue of material fact con-
cerning Ms. Hondroulis's consent, therefore, the motion was denied.
If Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 had been interpreted to
provide a rebuttable presumption of valid and informed consent to a
medical procedure as evidenced by a statutory consent form, the motion
79. Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 1218 (1977); Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 294
So. 2d 618 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 299 So. 2d 788 (1974).
80. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S. Ct. 560
(1972).
81. 553 So. 2d 398, 411-12 (La. 1989).
82. Id. at 412-13.
83. This cause of action is identical to Canterbury. Although the supreme court
does not expressly adopt Canterbury, Justice Dennis cites it eight times in his dissent
to the first ruling on Hondroulis and cites it thirteen times in the majority opinion of
the present case.
84. In Douget v. Touro Infirmary, 537 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), a
defendant successfully used a motion in limine to exclude evidence challenging the
validity of a consent form. A motion in limine could also be used to exclude a consent
form from the view of the jury.
85. 553 So. 2d at 419.
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for summary judgment would still have been denied. The consent form
would have been given a presumption of validity because of the ack-
nowledgment of disclosure as required by subsection (b). By alleging
that no communications beyond the consent form occurred, Ms. Hon-
droulis could have rebutted the presumption of valid consent and raised
a genuine issue of material fact. The motion for summary judgment
could have been denied under this reasoning.
CONCLUSION
By reinterpreting the Uniform Consent Law to provide a rebuttable
presumption of consent only to risks disclosed in the consent form,
the supreme court has taken a valuable protection away from physi-
cians. The Uniform Consent Law was enacted because of the medical
malpractice crisis. While the reinterpreting of the statute to provide
only a rebuttable presumption was necessary to avoid having an un-
constitutional statute, the limiting of the presumption was not. The
limiting of the presumption is not consistent with the legislative intent
of the statute. It is also a questionable policy choice considering the
rising price of medical costs and the threat of another medical mal-
practice crisis.
Cindy Matherne
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